HENRY A. KISSINGER PRIZE
HONORING FORMER CHANCELLOR DR. HELMUT KOHL

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The Henry A. Kissinger Prize was established in 2007 to honor the Academy’s Co-Chairman, former Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, whose initiatives for disarmament and détente in the post-war period helped lay the foundation for democratic change in Europe, the end of the Cold War, and the unification of Germany. In his more than forty years of active political service, Chancellor Kohl built on the traditions of Konrad Adenauer to establish Germany as the foundation for a Europe united within a democratic and secure Atlantic community. His tremendous achievements and legacy sculpted the post-Cold-War world we know today and strengthened the strong transatlantic cornerstones upon which the American Academy in Berlin is built. The 2011 Kissinger Prize is awarded to him in recognition of his singular role in achieving a lasting foundation for democratic peace in the new millennium.
On Monday, May 16, the American Academy in Berlin was honored to host the 2011 Henry A. Kissinger Prize, awarded to former Chancellor Helmut Kohl for his extraordinary role in German reunification and in laying the foundation for an enduring democratic peace in Europe. An audience of 350 guests witnessed the momentous event, as Academy Vice Chair Gahl Burt, US Ambassador to Germany Philip Murphy, Chancellor Angela Merkel, World Bank President Robert Zoellick, former US President Bill Clinton, and Academy President Norman Pearlstine stepped to the podium and spoke glowingly of the Chancellor’s singular achievements. The American consensus about Helmut Kohl’s legacy knew no party lines: both of the evening’s commemorative speakers, Robert Zoellick and Bill Clinton, hailed Kohl as one of the truly great post-war statesmen of Europe. Dr. Kohl’s acceptance speech, delivered extemporaneously, moved the entire audience to a prolonged standing ovation.

Afterwards, the exuberant crowd gathered in the Academy’s villa for a reception, where statesmen, academics, journalists, donors, trustees, and staff members reflected on the speakers’ words. The rain, which had poured down earlier, had abated, unleashing the pungency of early summer smells and accentuating the sensation, among all those present, of emerging from the evening with a new grasp of history. As the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung would later muse, “History is never written in the present tense. . . . But how, if not historic, should one describe what took place at the beginning of this week in Berlin, out there in Wannsee, in a tent in the garden of the American Academy?”

This sentiment was echoed in the overwhelming press response that followed in the next days, from reports in the Times of India to the New York Times. Over 1,000 articles appeared in German print and online media, in addition to extensive reporting in German TV and radio and widespread international coverage. “An homage that knew no holding back,” wrote Daniel Brössler in the Süddeutsche Zeitung. The Berliner Morgenpost described the atmosphere of the audience, keen to witness “a summit among statesmen who have written history.” We include an abridged review by Academy trustee and Kissinger Prize co-initiator Josef Joffe as a postscript to this documentation.

In the pages that follow, I would like to share our memories of the evening with you, and to thank you for your presence and your continued support of the Academy, which is dedicated to facilitating such meaningful transatlantic dialogue. I would also like to underscore our gratitude to Bosch AG, Cerberus Deutschland, and Klaus and Pia Krone for generously underwriting this evening.

Sincerely,
Gary Smith
Grabbing Providence’s Cloak

by Robert B. Zoellick

Unification called for his vision

Herr Doktor Kohl, Chancellor Merkel, Mr. President, Dr. Kissinger, ladies and gentlemen:

It is a particular pleasure that we are here under the auspices of the American Academy in Berlin. The founding of this Academy after the end of the Cold War evidences a wonderful insight about transatlantic ties in a new era.

This singular institution offers a place where American scholars and writers, cultural and political figures, can come together, share their experiences with, and learn from, the people of Berlin and Germany. It was envisaged as a true academy, “a living center for the exchange of ideas,” in the words of the late Ambassador Richard Holbrooke. And that is exactly what it has become.

There could be no better ambassador for the Academy and what it represents than Dr. Kissinger.

Henry Kissinger left Germany as a refugee. He built an extraordinary new life devoted to service to his new country as both a scholar and a statesman. He returned to Germany as a world figure. The prize that bears his name not only honors Dr. Kissinger’s achievements in diplomacy and foreign policy, it also recognizes the strength of the transatlantic relationship – its intellectual, cultural, and political strength.

At times during Dr. Kissinger’s long years of service, the ties between Europe and America have been stretched and strained. Yet his international assessments have always been grounded in realities. One essential that Dr. Kissinger always kept at the heart of his Weltanschauung is that Europe and the United States must be bound as allies. Though his achievements reached to China, the Middle East, Russia, and beyond, Dr. Kissinger always appreciated the centrality of Europe – and of Germany – because, for a maritime United States, the Atlantic must be a bond, not a barrier, and because of shared values born of entwined histories.

I would also like to say a few words about Richard Holbrooke.

I have been asked tonight to speak about Helmut Kohl. I have chosen to offer an account, for Germans and Americans, recalling Dr. Kohl’s legacy: his unshakeable belief in German and European unity and his commitment to the Atlantic Alliance.

Dr. Kohl’s beliefs led him – and Germany – to three decision points that have shaped our world today: German unification; the deployment of medium range missiles and the wielding of dual track diplomacy during the 1980s; and the creation of the European Single Market, the Euro, and the European economy of integration.

DECISION POINT: A VISION OF UNIFICATION

Great historical events can appear to be inevitable in hindsight. The reality is that events could have taken a different turn.

In November 1989, the East German regime had to give in to the pressure of the people and opened checkpoints in the Berlin Wall, allowing its citizens to travel freely to the West for the first time in almost three decades. At that moment, the most probable outcome was not that there would be a peacefully unified German state in less than a year, firmly anchored in the West.

The issues surrounding the events of 1989 had arisen faster than anyone at the time could have expected. They were driven by many deep historical currents: the growing evidence of a bankruptcy of Soviet-style political systems in Central and Eastern Europe and the courage of Central and Eastern Europeans to challenge those systems; the retrenchment of the Soviet Empire imposed by a collapsing economy; the appeal of West Germany and the new Europe amidst the resolve of the West; and the building demand for freedom and fundamental human and political rights that propelled the East German people to break through that wall.
But once the wall tumbled, statesmanship steered the sequence of events that followed. There were many voices – in London, Paris, Moscow, frankly, all across Europe and even some in Germany – urging caution or even opposing a united Germany. There were few voices calling for unification in the present.

Yet Helmut Kohl had vision. Dr. Kohl understood – perhaps earlier than anyone else at that time – that historical forces were at work in Europe. That this was finally the moment that Adenauer’s commitment of Freiheit vor Einheit could find its fulfillment through Freiheit und Einheit. That unity of the German people needed to go hand-in-hand with a united Europe. And that decisive moments are fleeting.

Dr. Kohl has since said that the moment when he truly sensed unification was coming was on his visit to Dresden a month after the opening of the Berlin Wall. Kohl recalled that “when I landed . . . on the bumpy concrete runway of the Dresden-Klotzsche airport, it suddenly became clear to me: this regime is finished. Unification is coming!”

He found the streets lined with thousands of people, holding placards proclaiming, “Deutschland – Einig Vaterland.” People shouted, “Helmut! Helmut!” and “Deutschland! Deutschland!” Kohl realized that the moment was ripe for unity – not in years or in decades, as he himself had believed only a year earlier. But in months. That evening, standing before the blackened ruins of the Frauenkirche, he called out to the tens of thousands of Dresdener with the words “liebe Landsleute.”

Dr. Kohl boldly shaped the agenda – guided by his vision – setting forth a 10-point plan for German unity that rapidly set the stage, even though in hindsight it seemed too pedestrian; partnering with Washington; reaching out to Moscow to convince the Soviet leadership. There were no opinion polls or focus groups that could truly measure the political popularity of his vision. There was no prepared plan to refine. There was no fallback. Kohl recognized the historical moment, seized it, and acted. Unification quickly gained unstoppable momentum.

He later explained to Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev: “I find something that Bismarck once said to be very good. ‘You cannot do something by yourself. You have to wait to hear the footsteps of God through the events, and then jump up and grab his coattails.’”

Kohl took a tremendous chance by following his instincts, and putting unification on the international agenda before it was ready for it. He was aided by the assurance of a strong relationship with the United States – a relationship characterized by experience, mutual respect, and above all, trust.

The depth of this trust stands out during the negotiations over unification.

In February 1990, within a day of each other, US Secretary of State James Baker and Chancellor Kohl journeyed to Moscow to meet with President Gorbachev. It had already become apparent that the Cold War order in Europe was collapsing, and there was agreement in Bonn and Washington that a new construction had to center on the rapid unification of Germany. Germany was the key.

But the Soviet Union remained the greatest obstacle in the path to Germany’s unification. It was crucial to secure Gorbachev’s agreement to proceed within a Two-plus-Four framework, allowing the two Germanies to work out the internal aspects of unification, and then – with the addition of France, Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union – to guide the end of the Four Power rights established after World War II within the context of a broader, changing international architecture. That design, too, required vision.

Following his meeting with President Gorbachev, Secretary Baker sensed a possible breakthrough on the creation of the Two-plus-Four process. Bob Gates and I were supposed to fly to brief Kohl. But there was not enough time. So Baker wrote Kohl a confidential letter detailing insights and suggestions on how the Chancellor might proceed in his own discussions.

President Bush followed up Baker’s guidance with his own letter to the Chancellor, assuring him of his personal support for a unified Germany within the Western alliance: “As our two countries journey together through this time of hope and promise, we can remain confident of our shared ability to defend the fruits of freedom,” President Bush wrote. “Nothing Mr. Gorbachev can say to Jim Baker or to you can change the fundamental fact of our deep and enduring partnership.”

In other words: We trust you, Chancellor. And you can trust us.

In his meeting in Moscow, Kohl seemed to gain Gorbachev’s support for the Two-Plus-Four process. It was launched a week later. The effect on Germans, East and West, was electric.
For the first time, they could see that other countries would support true unification. A month later, the voters of East Germany, sensing their opportunity, also reached for Providence’s cloak.

In July, 1990, Kohl and Gorbachev, along with their senior aides, Horst Teltschik and Anatoly Chernyayev, met alone in Moscow with their interpreters. Gorbachev made it clear that a unified Germany would be a member of NATO. At the time, Kohl showed no visible reaction. But Teltschik would later recall his excitement: “The breakthrough is accomplished! What a sensation!” he wrote, “For the Chancellor this conversation is an unbelievable triumph.”

BELIEFS

In the end, it was the German people who drove the unification process and determined the pace of events – millions of East Germans with a desire for freedom, ready to come west if German democracy and the Deutschmark did not come to them.

Yet it was Helmut Kohl who made a unified Germany politically conceivable and acceptable, because of who he was and what he believed in.

Rooted in his hometown of Ludwigshafen am Rhein, Kohl’s values, geopolitical views, and historical outlook were embedded in the Rhineland. From this western region he inherited an outlook that blended local ties with a sense of a European identity and role, and a close affinity with France.

Conservative and practical, his background to some degree mirrored that of Ronald Reagan, whose sensibilities were shaped by his Midwestern roots. Like Reagan, Kohl instinctively understood that in order to relate to people he had to have a sense of their dreams, fears, and moods – yet, at the same time, he perceived a leader had to shape general sentiments into direction. He understood that this was the essence of democratic leadership: the ability to rally the people at the right moment.

Dr. Kissinger, the adroit and shrewd diplomat-in-chief, recognized the limits of the international strategist, as well as the unique leading role of the democratic leader. “No foreign policy – no matter how ingenious – has any chance of success if it is born in the minds of a few and carried in the hearts of none,” wrote Kissinger.

Kohl’s outlook was reinforced by historical events. Born in 1930, Kohl often spoke of the special responsibility of those endowed with the “blessing of being born later” – too young to have been a victim or perpetrator under Nazism, yet gaining political consciousness amid the ruins of war. It shaped a belief in the possibility of Germans being able to express a “normal patriotism” for their country – a pride in culture and history that is taken for granted in other countries. It also shaped a belief in the need to contain German nationalism within an overarching sense of common European values.

At the same time, the spirit of the United States, experienced through postwar relief efforts, made a deep impression on Kohl. In later years, he would love to tell American visitors the story of how he met his future wife, Hannelore, at a local dance: he wearing a suit and she a dress, both received in a CARE package from the United States.

These views were given added weight by the policies of a line of extraordinary German postwar leaders.

Most importantly, Kohl was inspired by the integration and Western-leaning policies of Konrad Adenauer. Indeed, Kohl defined himself as “Adenauer’s grandson.” Like the great chancellor, Kohl was committed to the idea that German and European unity were “two sides of the same coin,” and convinced of the importance of the Atlantic Alliance for German security. These unshakable views were expressed at the start of his federal political career. In his first speech as CDU party chairman in 1973, Kohl told delegates it “is decisive that the idea of militant democracy remain the content of the Atlantic Community and of the movement for European unity.”

Kohl led the CDU to embrace the principles of Willy Brandt and Egon Bahr’s Ostpolitik – which he believed could be complemented with a “Westpolitik” that emphasized relations with the European Community and the United States on questions of security.
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DEcision Point: The Courage to Deploy Euromissiles

These policies – integration with Europe, the Atlantic Alliance, and Ostpolitik – laid the foundation for a unified Germany in 1990.

But history is shaped not by policies, but by the decisions of individuals.

And I believe historians will reflect that it was Helmut Kohl’s courageous decisions during one of the most critical periods in German history that opened the way to the historical opportunity to unify Germany.

When Kohl became chancellor in 1982, the political climate in Germany was a ferocious mixture of neutralism, anti-nuclear pacifism, and anti-Americanism. This was a response to the debate over NATO’s decision to deploy intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe to counter the Soviet SS-20s – a new generation of mobile Soviet missiles capable of hitting targets in Western Europe. For the Soviets, the SS-20s were a counter to British and French nuclear forces, and to the potency of America’s nuclear-armed planes that could strike Soviet territory. For the West, the SS-20s threatened a decoupling between the security of the United States and its NATO allies.

Kohl’s predecessor, Helmut Schmidt, along with his foreign minister and vice chancellor, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, had hoped that negotiations would persuade the Soviets not to deploy their new weapon. But they believed that if the Soviets could not be convinced, then NATO must respond.

Schmidt’s commitment to this dual-track strategy of restoring military parity as a basis for negotiations involved extremely high personal costs. It left him isolated from his own party, the SPD, which had already deeply divided on economic, environmental, and security issues after 16 years of governing, challenged on the left from the Greens and on the right from the CDU and FDP. The drift of the SPD – one of Germany’s two great Volksparteien – was no doubt also a sign of the seriousness of political shifts in Germany. Helmut Schmidt showed enormous moral courage in his firm stance on the question of America’s military presence in Europe, adhering to a sense of duty even though he knew it might end his political career.

The euromissile debate was the last great political conflict of the Cold War in Europe. At stake were not only Germany’s ties to the West, but more broadly, the resilience of the Atlantic Alliance and the political and moral resolve of the Western democracies in the face of Soviet intimidation.

The recollections of the emotional intensity of this issue for Germany will fade with passing generations. Even historians, peering back, will always miss the vantage point of the moment – because they know how the story ended.

Demonstrations against the missiles raged across a country grown weary of nearly 40 years of tension with the East, and steeped in a decade of Ostpolitik, which, to some extent, had lent a tone of moral equivalence to East and West. For the German Left, the euromissiles debate only reinforced the focus on similarities between the superpowers – in weapons and foreign policies – rather than on differences in societies and governments. For those protesting against the deployment of American missiles on German soil, the most important line of division ran not between dictatorships and democracies but between nuclear and non-nuclear powers. Paraphrasing von Clausewitz, historian Jeffrey Herf likened the political conflict in 1983 to “war by other means.”

Kohl recalled looking out upon the crowds gathered in the Hofgarten Park at Bonn University in October 1983 – thousands of protesters, who feared that deployment might spark a nuclear Armageddon. Kohl surveyed the scene, and asked himself, “Are they all wrong? Or are you?”

Yet Kohl’s courageous commitment to deploying the missiles, and operationalizing the dual-track approach that Schmidt and Genscher had put forward, was unyielding. The Bundestag debate in November 1983 was the 37th on the issue since 1979. Kohl told lawmakers: “We are not wanderers between East and West. . . . There is no middle way between democracy and dictatorship. We stand on the side of freedom.” Kohl supported the missiles both for defensive purposes and as an unmistakable affirmation of Germany’s position in the Western Alliance. He carried the vote in the Bundestag. The missiles were deployed.

Helmut Kohl’s decision in the euromissiles debate was not the popular one. He faced considerable opposition, risk, and uncertainty. But it was the right decision.

Kohl’s courageous stand helped to boost Western resolve against the Soviets and, in turn, weaken the resolve of the Soviet leadership. We now see his decision as having convinced Moscow to agree to the elimination of a whole category of weapons through the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Treaty. Indeed, Mikhail Gorbachev would later tell Kohl that NATO’s steadfastness in this decision “substantially contributed to the ‘new thinking’ in the Kremlin,” which allowed for the loosening of Soviet control over Eastern Europe and, ultimately, the collapse of communism.

Kohl’s steadfastness as an ally created an echo. When the movement for unification finally came, all of us knew Kohl, knew of his commitment to the Western Alliance, knew that he understood what being allies really meant. For Kohl, an alliance was not just words on a piece of paper or in fine halls followed by press conferences. An alliance was – and is – a shared sense of responsibility and duty to one another.

In 1989, the United States remembered all this. We remember it still. Celebrating the Day of German Unity together in 2006, President George H. W. Bush remarked of Helmut Kohl, “We would not be standing here if it were not for his vision, his tenacity, his singular leadership.” Bush expressed his conviction that history would rank Kohl as Europe’s greatest leader in the second half of the twentieth century.

Decision Point: The Commitment to the Euro and European Integration

For truly completing the vision of a free and united Germany, Kohl insisted that his country become inextricably tied to Europe, politically and financially. This commitment had been a key element in securing French support for German unification. By October 1990, Kohl had become the principal advocate for European Monetary Union. Less than a year after unification, the Maastricht Treaty was adopted, laying the groundwork.

Kohl then encouraged fellow leaders to fulfill their commitment to the Single Europe Act, paving the way for 1992’s single market. There were deep sensitivities within Germany to giving up the Deutschemark, which had become the repository for modern “acceptable” German nationalism. But Kohl focused
not on what was to be given up, but what was to be gained: the free movement of people, goods, services, and capital within a single space, a European space that could confound the ghosts of Europe’s past.

Yet by 1997, when it was clear that Germany was unlikely to meet the Maastricht fiscal criteria, Kohl faced another historic decision point: whether to delay European monetary union or push forward. His commitment propelled him ahead.

Kohl – like any practical political leader – recognized that his designs would remain unfinished. Work was still to be done, to be defined by different times and different people. The European economy would change. So would the world economy.

Kohl had built on the work of those who came before – from all parties, and also all Germans. But looking forward, he always followed a bright beacon. His fundamental question would always be: “What does this issue – faced by Germans – mean for Europe?” Kohl was committed to a peaceful Europe, offering better lives and opportunities for all its people; a closer Europe, but also a Europe in friendship and partnership with the United States.

So in pressing the case for monetary union, Kohl argued that adopting the Euro was not only about economic union, but, ultimately a question of war and peace – a protection against reviving past national rivalries. “Europe will only be a success if we are patient with each other and have respect for each other, respect for the present generation and respect for the history of future generations,” Kohl affirmed in a speech on the day that eleven European nations agreed to participate in the Euro.

CONCLUSION
Dr. Kohl built on the policies of his predecessors. But as a leader, he had to make his own decisions in his own time and place.

Unification called for his vision.
His deployment of Euromissiles drew on his courage.
Monetary Union and the integration of Europe’s economy depended on his commitment.
This vision. This courage. And this commitment. Together, they describe what made Kohl great.

Dr. Kohl managed his country’s unity with enormous skill: a practical understanding of German interests as well as European apprehensions; a shrewd appreciation of domestic politics; and a well-developed awareness of the personal dimensions of statecraft.

Above all, Kohl has been a pragmatist, prepared and ready to exercise power in a democracy. A steady hand at the rudder, he guided his country in a world of change. In a conversation with an American ambassador, Kohl once remarked, “We Germans have the tendency to keep our heads in the clouds, and often time that leads to trouble. But that’s not me. I achieve things by keeping my feet on the ground.”

So he did. In doing so, he left one more legacy to his fellow Germans. The privilege to feel proud, as Germans and Europeans.

In the affairs of the world, countries cannot rest on past achievements. Indeed, the more recognition they earn, the more others may look to them. So it is today, for my country and for Germany.

Helmut Kohl heard the footsteps of Providence and grabbed her cloak. Given his size, I think he even managed to steer Providence a bit!

So tonight it is a signal honor for me . . . on an occasion hosted by America’s living Academy in Berlin . . . with an honor named for America’s great practitioner and ongoing student of statecraft and history . . . to respectfully suggest Helmut Kohl’s distinctive place in history.
Drawing Inspiration from Kohl’s Convictions

by William Jefferson Clinton

Think of all the decisions that had to be made after the Berlin Wall fell. The one that gained Helmut Kohl the greatest acclaim, for good reason, is “would East and West Germany be reunified,” but beneath that, if so, on what terms, how? Would Russia become a truly democratic partner with Germany, with Europe and the West, or would they embrace a different kind of hostile autocracy? It was not clear. Remember all those people that were running for the president of Russia in the early days? Would there be a really strong European Union, economically and politically? And how should the US think about it?

When I ran for president, there were actually people in the United States that thought European union was somehow terrible for the United States, that Europe would grow bigger and more prosperous than America – oh, how awful that would be. I said, “That’s a good thing.” But if the European Union would be big and strong, what would that mean? And how open would the doors remain to new members? What about nato, question four.

Everybody’s forgotten this; a lot of people really did think that nato had fulfilled its purpose when the Berlin Wall fell, and we should just let it go. Bring the troops home from Germany; save the money. We had long deferred needs in the United States. And if we stayed, what in the heck was nato supposed to do, and who could be in nato? How would it relate to Russia? And finally, what about Yugoslavia? As it also devolved into independent states and the violence in Bosnia rose, would anybody in Europe be responsible? Could nato have a role outside its own members’ borders, something that had never happened before?

And what could Germany do about it? Because the Germans, while a member of nato, had never, since World War II, sent German troops beyond its own borders. He had to deal with every one of these questions. And I would argue that the reason my predecessor George H. W. Bush and I both believe Helmut Kohl was the most important European statesman since World War II is that he answered every single one of these questions correctly. Correctly for Germany, correctly for Europe, correctly for the United States, correctly for the future of the world.

Why? Because the fundamental character of the twenty-first-century world is its interdependence. Whether we like it or not, what happens in one place affects people in another. Whether
we like it or not, borders look more like nets than walls. Whether we like it or not, all the things that give us so many benefits and enable us to prosperously sit in this beautiful setting tonight also make people more vulnerable to the forces of destruction. Whether we like it or not, there is not even a clear dividing line anymore between what is domestic and international policy. In such a world, the clear mission of people of conscience who love liberty and decency and want prosperity for their people wherever they live is to build up the positive and reduce the negative forces of our interdependence and to find ways to organize ourselves so that we can take advantage of the positive as we reduce the negative. All these things that now seem so self-evident were not self-evident when Helmut Kohl had to make the calls.

Enough has been said and written by people who were there and involved in his decision on unification. I want to talk about the others because we were there together. We went to East Germany once, to a meeting at Frederick the Great’s palace, to visit an Opel plant. I used to drive a Buick Opel when I was a little boy, or a young man, anyway. I looked at the people in the streets when there was still enormous income disparity. And Helmut and I had talked over our many meetings and meals together. Hillary says I always loved Kohl best because he’s the only politician I ever met with a bigger appetite than I had.

But really, I can’t imagine it was wildly popular in West Germany the first time that people got short of money that he was shipping 500 million dollars a year, or whatever it was, to the East, but he knew that under the best of circumstances the disparity was so great that at some point the very people he tried to help by bringing them into a unified Germany might become a political whirlwind force against his own leadership. But he did the right thing anyway. And it’s not easy.

I can tell you, all over the world, this question of economic disparity within national borders is threatening the capacity of people to do the right thing beyond their borders, everywhere in the world. India has the world’s largest middle class and the largest number of really poor people. China has taken more people out of poverty in the last twenty years than ever moved out of poverty in any political unit in history, and yet there are still desperately poor people in rural areas. In the United States, our Native American populations and the rural populations, black, Hispanic, and white are dramatically less well off than people who live in our urban areas and our suburbs. It is a global problem. And he had it amplified because of the transfer from communism to democratic Germany in the unification.

Second thing: When I became president, Germany was the biggest supporter of a democratic Russia under Boris Yeltsin. And the United States under George H. W. Bush was the second largest supporter. I got elected president because we had an economic problem at home, and the first thing I had to do in the spring was to decide whether to put together a 24 billion dollar aid package for Russia. The American people were 74% against it. I talked to Helmut.

The Russians wanted to bring their soldiers home from the Baltic States. Yeltsin did not want to be viewed as an imperialist; he wanted a constructive relationship with Europe. They did not have the money to find housing for their people. And Germany was all out there, in effect, on a per person basis so far ahead of every other country. So one of my young aides showed me a poll that said “Mr. President, the American people are against your proposal to help Russia 74 to 20.” I said, “They may be, but three or four years from now, if Russia turns out to be a hyper-nationalist autocracy, with angry poor people who hate America,
they’ll be against me 74 to 20, not my proposal. We got hired to do the right thing here. Look at what Germany’s doing: let’s do that.

I can’t tell you how many times I knew what the right thing to do was because of what he had already done. And with all the ups and downs with Russia, even the challenges that Chancellor Merkel faces today, they never voted for a neo-communist government, they never voted for an imperialist nineteenth-century government, they have struggled to maintain a constructive relationship with Germany, with Europe, with the United States. I have no idea what would have happened if Germany had walked away from Russia and allowed it to collapse to make a mockery of the end of communism and the promise of enterprise. It’s easy to think this is a fool’s errand now because they’ve found lots of oil and gas and the price is high and they’re rolling in money now. It was a nightmare for a few years. And he was there.

Then we had to decide what to do about the EU; you know about that. All I had to do on that was cheer and say I thought Americans who were insecure about the promise of the European Union were being silly. We should never ask anyone else to give up their moment in the sun, never ask anyone else not to maximize their potential, never be afraid of competition from anyone else, as long as it’s on fair terms.

But NATO, now that was another thing altogether. He supported bringing the Warsaw Pact countries into NATO. He knew instinctively we needed to work for the best and prepare for something less in terms of our common security. He knew we needed to leave the doors open, and in 1997, when we let Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic into NATO, the beginning of the expansion that included others – that’s where he had been all along. We were alone, almost, in the early days of my presidency, in trying to get NATO and our European allies to take a tougher line on Bosnia, when people were dying like flies. And the arms embargo was enforced in a way that only helped the Bosnian Serbs and disadvantaged the Bosnian Muslims and Croatsians because the Serbs had access to the manufacturing capacity of Belgrade. And then when we made the deal in Dayton sixteen years ago, Helmut Kohl said, “Germany should participate in the first out-of-area deployment of NATO troops since the creation of NATO at the dawn of the Cold War.” And you did. In every case I would argue that he was right. In Bosnia, in NATO, in the European Union, with regard to Russia and with regard to German unification. Five big issues.

When I sit alone and make a list of the things I did in foreign policy that I’m really proud of, there’s something in the last four categories – the unification happened before I showed up – and I realized that all I had to do, to do things I am now, as I move into my old age, really proud of, all I had to do was to follow Helmut Kohl’s lead. In 1994, we walked arm-in-arm through the Brandenburg Gate to the eastern side and had the first great public rally with an American president on the eastern side of the gate. I looked into the eyes of all those hopeful young Germans. And I looked at Helmut Kohl, and I knew that he would realize their hopes for Germany. I knew he had the vision, I knew he had the ability, I knew he had the determination.

The 21st century in Europe really began on his watch. It began with his generous vision for German reunification, with his generous and determined support for democratic Russia, for European unification, politically and economically, for bringing other nations into NATO and defining a 21st century mission for NATO so that it didn’t become just a hollow shell of people going to meetings and sharing platitudes, but actually an organization with a mission to help make Europe united, whole, democratic – free for the first time since nation-states rose on the European continent. It had never happened before. Helmut Kohl has been a good personal friend to me – and to the secretary of state, I have on good authority. He has been a wonderful friend to America. But most of all he was a friend to the people who put him in office, to the German people. And to young Germans who have been born since he left office and may not even know who he is, I ask those of you here never to allow anyone to take for granted the fact that at a pivotal moment in the history of Europe and the history of the world, Germany was called upon to answer five big questions, and by great good fortune and good judgment, a man who was big in more than physical stature, answered all five correctly. Never take that for granted and never squander that legacy.

Thank you. Thank you, my friend.
Saying “Yes” to a Common Future
by Helmut Kohl

Mr. President, honored presidents, dear Henry Kissinger, dear friend who has lent this prize your good name, ladies and gentlemen!

So much is going through my mind at this moment. I am 81 years old now, and here today in these last few hours I have witnessed a flashback of a piece of my life right before my eyes. I have taken it all in with considerable emotion, I confess, but also knowing full well that those in attendance are by no means typical of the German audience. The normal German audience is an audience which would be far more negatively inclined at such moments, on such festive occasions.

And I want to thank all those who helped make this event possible, particularly the members of the Board of Trustees of the American Academy in Berlin, for this prize, which is as extraordinary as it is symbolic. The two half-shells correspond to what we commonly think of when we speak of money and monetary matters in the European Union – and that is as it should be. But this prize also bears a highly symbolic meaning in what it allows us to infer: that we have an opportunity for the future.

And, you see, just yesterday I had occasion to speak with young people of my political persuasion from all over Europe. And of course I reminded them what it was like at the end of the Second World War, especially here in the city of Berlin, where Hitler committed suicide. I was 15 years old back then, it was another time, and I do not want to dwell on that time now. However: so much has happened since.

The fact that we are meeting here today in the American Academy, in Berlin, not just anywhere, but in the heart of Germany, in Berlin, is for me a wonderful thing. And of course I reminded them what it was like at the end of the Second World War, especially here in the city of Berlin, where Hitler committed suicide. I was 15 years old back then, it was another time, and I do not want to dwell on that time now. However: so much has happened since.

We have perhaps forgotten in Germany, given all the misery perpetrated in Germany’s name, that there is something we can be proud of. And given what we have accomplished in the years following the end of the war, we have every reason to be proud.

Herr Präsident, meine Herren Präsidenten, lieber Henry Kissinger, der Du dem Preis Deinen Namen gegeben hast, meine Damen und Herren!


Und ich danke all denen, die dabei geholfen haben, vor allem dem Kuratorium, für diesen Preis, der ungewöhnlich ist und auch symbolisch ist. Die beiden Halbschalen entsprechen dem, was in der Europäischen Union üblich ist, wenn dort über Geld und Geldwerte geredet wird, das gehört sich so. Aber das ist zugleich von einer hohen symbolischen Bedeutung, weil wir daraus etwas entnehmen können: dass wir eine Chance haben.


Wir haben vielleicht verleibt in Deutschland, vor lauter Elend, was auch im deutschen Namen geschehen ist, dass wir auf etwas stolz sind. Und auf das, was wir in diesen Jahren geleistet haben, haben wir allen Grund stolz zu sein. Es stand nirgendwo geschrieben, dass es Amerikaner geben wird, Männer von Rang und Männer
Nowhere was it preordained that there would be Americans, men of stature, notable men, who would build an American Academy using all means available and conceivable, an institution that would continually develop itself further, ensuring that important ideas will be cultivated and new horizons opened.

A president is here tonight, as is one of the most important “ambassadors” of the United States in decades – the former American secretary of state – and many others are with us today, all of whom, have, in their ideas and their deeds, added rungs to this mighty ladder to the future. We have, metabolically speaking, heard old poems recited here, but we did not experience them the way schoolchildren do when reading Goethe’s verse; what we heard was the rhyme within the verse, as it were, tapping the true meaning, as we were meant to. And we are once again in the thick of things. And this, to tell you the truth, is the main reason I accepted this award: Because even after I am gone, I want there to be future generations in Germany who cultivate interests in the spirit of this wonderful institute, I want an entire generation of young Germans to grow up saying: “I am going to America. I want to learn something there, also to learn and see something else. And let me return home from Milwaukee to Rheinland-Pfalz having gained the feeling that I am a true citizen of this modern world.”

We have done enough … Ladies and gentlemen – and I say this now as a German – we Germans have already committed enough wrongdoing in our name and by our will. We swore, almost 70 years ago now, never to do again what we did, that is true. But do we have the strength, not only not to repeat the bad, but to apply our understanding of the past towards a greater good? And that is why I maintain that occasions such as this one here today in Berlin are ideally suited for us to walk a little while together along this path and reflect upon our journey.

We achieved German reunification – so many kind words have been spoken about this that I have nothing more to add. But let me just remind you that, if back in the fall of 1989, in the old Federal Republic of Germany, we had put it to a vote, I am not at all certain that we would have had a majority in favor. Never mind, that was 1989, and this is 2011. We achieved the great goal. Back in my day, when I was young and also of the opinion that old Konrad Adenauer was much too old to still be in office, and when we heard Adenauer speak of German unity and German freedom and the German common good as a small matter of great import for our life we sometimes believed in it, and we are speaking, heard old poems recited here, but we did not experience them the way schoolchildren do when reading Goethe’s verse; what we heard was the rhyme within the verse, as it were, tapping the true meaning, as we were meant to. And we are once again in the thick of things. And this, to tell you the truth, is the main reason I accepted this award: Because even after I am gone, I want there to be future generations in Germany who cultivate interests in the spirit of this wonderful institute, I want an entire generation of young Germans to grow up saying: “I am going to America. I want to learn something there, also to learn and see something else. And let me return home from Milwaukee to Rheinland-Pfalz having gained the feeling that I am a true citizen of this modern world.”

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It is true that we have many problems. Every day we hear reports about prices rising, doubts about our incomes keeping pace, and all the sort of stuff the media keep telling us. Yet we have achieved a future that is truly viable in the best sense of the word. Let us say “yes” to this life. After all that happened, we, the Germans, want to say “yes” to our own future. We have understood that our future cannot only signify a “German future,” but must also always be a “common future” shared with others, with neighbors, with our neighbors in the European Community. And then we open the newspaper and read of the problems the Greeks are having and are told that we cannot ask our people to take on a greater share of the financial burden and face price increases, and everything else that is written and said about it.
Never mind: we will go our way together, and together with the Greeks. And whoever says today: “We must abandon everything we built up in Europe and start over again,” is mistaken. We must keep walking this road together, no matter how hard this way might prove. And this is the most important thing now, this consciousness must not be lost – it is our road to the future, and we will have to walk it with deliberation and clarity. Wise individuals have just spoken here today about the recent past, some in very flattering terms about my role in it. That was a part of our history. But now we are entering a new chapter of our history. The year 2011 will be followed by a year 2020 and many more years to come.

I would like to take this opportunity this evening to urge you all as follows: Remember this evening. Remember the roots of our coming together, roots we can still recognize, and of which we are perhaps even justifiably proud. And let us keep walking along this road together. Germany must not become a country that always waits for others. We must also be here to stand by others.

Foremost among our neighbors I will always hail our American friends. You see, we talk of Nuremberg today, but few of us think in this moment of what happened in Nuremberg back in 1945/1946. That was history, and we must convey it to the next generation. This is my appeal to all of you: let us pull together and make this world safe and secure, as we would like it to be: a free world, a world with honest, upstanding people, a world in which people dare strive to fulfill their dreams, and in which they are free in the broadest sense possible.

I see no cause for that pessimism that I still find some mornings in the lead articles of authors who are even paid to write so schwierig dieser Weg sein kann. Und – das ist das Allerwichtigste, das Bewusstsein darf nicht abhandenkommen – es ist unser Weg, und den wollen wir mit Überlegtheit und Klarheit gehen. Das, was hier kluge Leute eben über die Zeit berichtet haben, zum Teil auch in für mich sehr freundlicher Weise berichtet haben, war ein Teil unserer Geschichte, aber jetzt gehen wir in einen neuen Abschnitt unserer Geschichte. Dem Jahr 2011 wird ein Jahr 2020 folgen und vieles mehr.

Ich möchte eigentlich die Gelegenheit heute Abend nur nutzen, Ihnen allen zuzurufen: Denken Sie an diesen heutigen Abend. Denken Sie an die Wurzeln, die wir heute noch erkennen, auf die wir vielleicht sogar stolz sind, und lassen Sie uns auf diesem Weg weitergehen. Deutschland darf kein Land werden, das immer auf andere wartet, sondern wir sind auch für die anderen da.


Ich sehe keinen Grund für jenen Pessimismus, den ich so manchen Morgen noch in Leitartikeln von Autoren, die für diesen Unsinn auch noch bezahlt werden, lese. Ich möchte dafür plädieren, dass wir selber an diese Zukunft glauben und uns das etwas kosten lassen. Das heißt, dass wir anderen helfen und unseren Einsatz leisten. Und dann, meine Damen und Herren, bin ich sicher, wird irgendwann in dieser Akademie, die dann vielleicht einen anderen Namen haben
such nonsense. I would like to urge us all to believe in this future and to value it enough to be willing to pay for it. That means that we must help others and make our contribution. And then I am quite certain, ladies and gentlemen, that one day in this Academy, which may then have a different name, another event such as this one will take place, at which people entirely unknown to each other will gather. But they will agree on one thing: we want to continue along this road and to stand together to shape a better future for all.

And to that end, may I wish many blessings, God’s blessings, on our country, that we not weaken in our conviction, and that we apply that conviction for the common good.

A day such as this one, on which an American president and a world renowned diplomatic author are present, a day on which many guests from all over Europe have gathered, is truly a good occasion to declare: Come what may, we will remain the ones who in a difficult time put our country back on its feet. And if another wind knocks us down, then we will just have to get up again.

I have a simple wish: Let us do just that. Let us live by our convictions so that we need not be ashamed, but rather in such a way that allows us to say: “These Germans and these Europeans and their American friends, despite all the difficulties they face, find the right path forward.” And to that end I wish us all the strength to persevere.

Translated from the German by Peter Wortsman
2010 Holtzbrinck Fellow at the American Academy
Helmut Kohl, the award recipient, was rolled onto the stage, a monument unto himself. With features chiseled as if in stone, gone was the softness that once evidenced an insatiable epicurism. Head tilted to one side, hands inert, he spoke without notes for half an hour. And touched the souls of the 350 guests who came to honor him. The American Academy in Berlin awarded him the Henry Kissinger Prize for exceptional accomplishments in transatlantic relations.

The new Germany has become unsentimental and aloof; it shuns public emotion and ritual. It has nearly forgotten this man, whom history will rank next to Bismarck and Adenauer as one of the true virtuosos of statecraft. Thus the Americans must provide pathos and reverence: the commemorative speakers Bill Clinton and Bob Zoellick, the president of the World Bank. Esprit was added by Henry Kissinger, when he reminded Kohl how he had once asked him what would have become of the American statesman if he hadn’t been driven out of Germany. Henry: “Secondary school teacher in Nuremberg.” Kohl: “No, you would have at least made it to Munich.”

Zoellick recounted how Kohl took hold of destiny’s cloak at a time when every single step could have led to utter ruin. “History,” said Zoellick, “is shaped not by policies, but by the decisions of individuals.” Clinton went on to evoke the terrifying questions Kohl had once faced: Would the only change in Russia be that of a dictatorship’s label? Would the Alliance sink into the Atlantic? Would Germany become part of the West? Would the Balkans disintegrate into war? Kohl “answered every single one of these questions correctly – correctly for Germany, Europe, and the future of the world.” He, Clinton, knew it back then: “All I had to do was follow Helmut Kohl’s lead; he had the vision, the ability, and the determination.”

In fact, at every breaking point, Kohl did the right thing. He pushed through missile deployment, which led to a change of thinking in the Kremlin, as Gorbachev later admitted. He bound Germany to the West, rather than to neutrality, with strong assistance from the US. He then assuaged neighbors’ fears of a “Germanized Europe,” by Europeanizing Germany through the currency union.

Missile deployment, reunification, communitization: three correct historical decisions. Another chancellor would have been satisfied with a single first-place prize. And in domestic policy? Clinton and Kissinger came to praise Kohl for his foreign policy achievements. These achievements have nearly been forgotten by the Germans. History, however, will remember them forever – just as it has Bismarck and Adenauer.

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