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Dictatorship and Information
Axel Springer Lecture
Political scientists have long argued that autocratic regimes that lack adequate information about popular preferences will be short-lived and unstable. But communist regimes are on average very resilient. Based on his archival findings on China and Eastern Europe, Martin Dimitrov explores how communist regimes manage the problem of information scarcity by creating institutions for collecting information that is provided either involuntarily or voluntarily. The involuntary collection of information is executed primarily through the intelligence network of the secret police and allows the regime to track the level of political dissent in society. The voluntary provision of information takes place through citizen complaints and denunciations and is useful for assessing popular preferences about redistribution. Martinov argues that regime resilience is a delicate balancing act that is predicated on the smooth operation of the two systems for collecting information. When one system malfunctions, regime resilience is endangered. When both systems malfunction, regime collapse is likely.